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Bruce Barton
Subjectivity<>Culture<>Communications<>Intermedia:
a meditation on the“impure interactions”of performance
and the“in-between”space of intimacy in a wired world
This“meditation”pursues four objectives.The first is to provide an
introduction to a variety of psychological interpretations of the
concept of intimacy in terms of its motivations, characteristics,
and functions within the larger understanding of the construction,
maintenance, and expansion of the“self” in relationship and inter-
action. The second objective is to attempt to locate these psycho-
logical observations on intimacy within broader socio-anthropo-
logical frameworks, in order to consider if and how they are mani-
fest in cultural and ideological developments.The third objective is
to overlay these initial findings withmultiple theories of commun-
ications and media influence on individuals and communities, as
they relate to the reformation of and potential for intimacy in
contemporary mediatized societies. The pursuit here is of a
composite “logic” of resonance, interconnection, and generalized
causality within these overlapping evolutionary spheres (psychol-
ogy, sociology, communications). The fourth objective is to eluci-
date (as opposed to“define”) the elusive concept of intermedia as it
is understood, analyzed, and enacted by contemporary practition-
ers and theorists, with a particular emphasis on the role of intim-
acy in terms of intention, design, and experience. Finally, the
emerging theoretical insights generated are tentatively applied to a
performance by the intermedial, site-specific performance troupe
Bluemouth Inc.Presents. In the process of these inquiries, I hope to
establish intermedia—and, specifically, intermedial intimacy—as
the recognizable (though not necessarily inevitable) offspring of
the previously explored personal, cultural, and ideological devel-
opments.
Cette « méditation » poursuit quatre objectifs. Le premier : présenter
diverses interprétations du concept d’intimité tel qu’il est entendu
dans le domaine de la psychologie (motivations, caractéristiques et
fonctions) et les placer dans le cadre plus large de la construction, de
l’entretien et de l’expansion du « soi » dans le contexte d’une relation
et d’une interaction. Le second objectif : inscrire ces observations sur
l’intimité dans un cadre socio-anthropologique plus vaste pour voir si
on les retrouve dans des développements culturels et idéologiques. Le
troisième objectif : superposer à ces premières constatations quelques
théories de la communication ayant trait à l’influence des médias sur
l’individu et la société en rapport avec la réforme de l’intimité et son
potentiel dans des sociétés contemporaines médiatisées. Cet objectif
est celui d’une « logique » composite de la résonnance, de l’intercon-
nexion et de la causalité généralisée au sein même des sphères évolu-
tionnaires qui se chevauchent (psychologie, sociologie, communica-
tion). Le quatrième objectif est de clarifier (plutôt que « définir ») le
concept insaisissable d’intermédia tel que l’entendent, l’analysent et
le mettent en œuvre des praticiens et théoriciens contemporains.Une
importance toute particulière est accordée au rôle de l’intimité en ce
qui a trait à l’intention, à la conception et à l’expérience. Et enfin,
l’auteur tentera de mettre en pratique les théories en émergence en se
servant de l’exemple d’une représentation intermédia localisée de la
compagnie Bluemouth Inc. Au fil de son enquête, l’auteur souhaite
montrer que l’intermédia – et plus précisément, l’intimité intermédia
– est le produit reconnaissable (mais pas nécessairement inévitable)




Whenever possible, we attempt to create intimacy with the
audience by sharing the performance space with them.
(Bluemouth 17)
In three recent issues of Canadian Theatre Review (CTR Nos.126,127,and 129), I have explored, from a variety of separate but
related perspectives, the process and product of Bluemouth Inc.
Presents, a site-specific intermedia performance troupe located in
Toronto and New York.1 My engagement with this company takes
multiple forms, personal and professional,2 yet the troupe
remains—happily—a fertile enigma for me, one that both evokes
and provokes emerging understandings of intention, strategy, and
possibility in performance.
To a large degree, the inspiration for this current body of writ-
ing lies squarely in my experience of Bluemouth’s pieces—in
particular, their 2003 three-part production Something About a
River (begun in 2002), their 2005 reimaging of American Standard
(originally performed in 2001), and their 2006 remount of Lenz
(first performed in 2002). In the CTR article that focuses on the
second of these three productions (“The Razor’s Edge”), I
52 • TRiC / RTaC • 29.1 (2008) • Bruce Barton • pp 51-92
attempted to identify the visceral quality and impact of the show:
I have several images from Bluemouth Inc. Presents’ 2005
staging of the performance piece American Standard deeply
engrained inmymemory,any one of whichwould doBertO.
States3 proud.They range from subtle and seductive through
overwhelming (in multiple senses of that term). The most
insistent, however, returns me vividly to the moment when
Stephen O’Connell literally rolled up Lucy Simic like a sack
of rags and forcefully jammed her into the tiny space
beneath the chair I was sitting on. This moment existed
within a broader theatrical narrative—abstract, alinear,
composite, and elusive, certainly, but also characterized by
intention and an investment in conventions of accessibility.
But the numerous strands of Simic’s hair that remained
under one of the legs of my chair were concrete, consequen-
tial, and disinterested in the sustained fiction of theatricality.
That moment, for me, was what American Standard was
about. (23)
I have come to understand thismoment as perhaps one of themost
intimate I have ever experienced in a theatrical context. Further—
and problematically—I have also come to understand this im-
mediate, unmediated confrontation with the performers’ bodies as
a constitutive element within Bluemouth’s often overtly interme-
dial strategies, specifically in the tensions, both overt and implicit,
between the gravitational attractions of theatricality and perform-
ativity that it makes manifest.
The CTR issue quoted from above, one of the most ambitious
and crowded to appear in some time, is a collection of articles on
site-specific theatre edited by Andrew Houston and Laura Nanni.
Perhaps most distinctive in this distinctive issue was the entry by
Bluemouth. Entitled “Please Dress Warmly and Wear Warm
Shoes,” the piece was a thoroughly and explicitly collaborative pro-
ject for the four-member company.4 Each individual in the troupe
took on a particular aspect of site-specific work to consider within
the article; once the original sections had been completed, these
were circulated among the other members, all of whom were free
to write into and through the original author’s contribution. Each
member adopted a characteristic font, and these different type-
faces were carried through to the publication of the article. The
result approaches a sort of conceptual hypertext,with each shift in
font (there are many) potentially drawing the reader to make
connections across and throughout the remainder of the article, as
the individual voices of the company members emerge as some-
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how both separate yet irresolvably intertwined. It is an article that
unfailingly yields new insights with every encounter.
Particularly intriguing—and significant for this discussion—
is the number of times the word “intimacy” appears in the article
(although, as my experience of American Standard suggests, this
came less as a surprise than a confirmation). However, in the
context of their effort to articulate some of the principles of their
practice—a brave, generous, and treacherous errand, to be sure—
the obviousness and the elusiveness of the term unavoidably
pressed multiple questions into articulation.What does intimacy
in intermedia performance mean?What does it consist of? In what
ways might it be manifested? What might it facilitate or accom-
plish? Is such a worthy and laudable objective even possible?5
It is perhaps most accurate to suggest that this article is about
Bluemouth only indirectly, via inspiration and evocation. For this
meditation has several sequential objectives that emerge out of—
and, ultimately, lead back into—theatrical considerations by way
of diverse and extended but, I hope, rewarding interdisciplinary
excursions. My itinerary of objectives follows four main areas of
inquiry:
Subjectivity: The first objective is to provide an introduction to a
variety of psychological interpretations of the concept of
intimacy in terms of its motivations, characteristics, and
functions within the larger understanding of the construc-
tion, maintenance, and expansion of the“self” in relationship
and interaction.
Culture: The second objective is to attempt to locate these
psychological observations on intimacy within broader
socio-anthropological frameworks, in order to consider if
and how they are manifest in cultural and ideological devel-
opments.
Communications: The third objective is to overlay these initial
findings with multiple theories of communications and
media influence on individuals and communities, as they
relate to the reformation of and potential for intimacy in
contemporary mediatized societies. The pursuit here is of a
composite “logic” of resonance, interconnection, and gener-
alized causality within these overlapping evolutionary
spheres (psychology, sociology, communications).
Intermedia: The fourth objective is to elucidate (as opposed to
“define”) the elusive concept of intermedia as it is under-
stood, analyzed, and enacted by contemporary practitioners
and theorists,with a particular emphasis on the role of intim-
acy in terms of intention, design, and experience. In the
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process, I hope to establish intermedia—and, specifically,
intermedial intimacy—as the recognizable (if not necessarily
inevitable) offspring of the previously explored personal,
cultural, and ideological developments.
Clearly, each of these objectives demands far more attention
than I can offer it in the context of this already lengthy overview,
and I amwell aware of the yawning chasms that lie on either side of
my wanderings through these relatively unfamiliar territories.
Through a brief re-acquaintance with Bluemouth, my final steps
on this amble begin to explore the potential application of this
theoretical matrix.Within the context of this discussion, however,
it must, of necessity, remain largely that—potential: an abstract
but, I believe, evocative map for future ambling.
Subjectivity
i. looking for intimacy
Closeness and intimacy may mean different things, have
different bases, and take different forms depending on the
constructions of self and social reality that inform relation-
ship experience in different cultural worlds.
(Adams,Anderson, andAdonu 333)
What is intimacy? What makes a moment, a gesture, an interac-
tion, a relationship intimate? As the above quotation suggests,
“intimacy”exhibits a high degree of flexibility and ongoing recon-
textualization. The available literature on the topic is extensive and
diverse, ranging from religious tracts and self-help volumes
through dense statistical reports. Between these extremes, the
dance of psychology, sociology, and anthropology reveals disci-
plinary tensions at key sites of meaning and terminology.Nowhere
is this more conspicuous than in the competing understandings of
“self,” without which, it would seem, no definition of intimacy is
possible.
The regularity with which uses such as “true self,” “real self,”
and “private self” appear, to differing degrees, across the multiple
streams of psychological material (social, health, motivational,
developmental, educational, organizational, experimental, etc.) is,
from a humanities perspective, both unnerving and, ultimately,
deceiving. Certainly, within the contemporary writing on intim-
acy, conceptions of self gravitate towards the concept as functional
and negotiable, if not entirely a construction.Nonetheless, the rela-
tively common investment in the categorization and stability of
“self-hood” can result in strongly normative descriptions. For
instance, Geraldine K. Piorkowski’s Too Close for Comfort:
Exploring the Risks of Intimacy (1994) proceeds from a conception
of personality that posits an “innermost” or “Private Self,” around
which a secondary “Social Self ” and tertiary “Work Self ” are
wound, onion-like, in a manner reminiscent of Ibsen’s Peer Gynt.
Established in infancy, the Private Self—home to our “most
personal longings, deepest feelings, and most tender vulnerabili-
ties”—is progressively masked for protection through the subse-
quent layering of selective, stereotype-based filtering via the Social
Self and logical, function-based utility via theWork Self (11-14).
Most to the point, however, while the Private Self, which
Piorkowski also calls the “Intimate” Self, ideally remains available
for modification throughout an individual’s life, “the contents of
this early level become walled off from awareness and later experi-
ence, only to be jolted into existence by the stirrings of intimacy”
(12).A decade after Piorkowski’s contribution, the central relation-
ship between intimacy and the identification, realization, and
development of an individual’s “true self” demonstrates notable
durability:
[I]ntimacy requires [. . .] willingness and ability to disclose
the true self (one’s thoughts, feelings,wishes, fears) and to be
a [sic] responsive and accepting of the partner’s true self
[. . .]. In addition to these essential abilities [. . .] intimacy also
requires the ability to feel comfortable with an autonomous
self (an appropriate balance between autonomy and intim-
acy) [. . .]. (Collins and Feeney 173)
A wide range of available theories of intimacy demonstrate similar
investment in the relative autonomy of self: “optimal distinctive-
ness theory [suggests that] identity may be threatened if distinc-
tions between self and other become unclear,” while “object rela-
tions theory argues that the self should be able to differentiate its
own perceptions, ideas, and feelings from those of the other [. . .]”
(Mashek and Sherman 348).
Perhaps not surprisingly,much of the available research origi-
nates in the United States of America, which has historically
demonstrated an enduring (even passionate) preoccupation with
intimacy conceptually, behaviourally, and ideologically. For some
researchers, it is precisely the seeming ill-fit between general
conceptions of intimacy and perceived American tendencies
towards individualism that inspires inquiry:
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[I]ndividualism shapes many Americans’ understanding of
the self, particularly those from European-American back-
grounds. [. . .] Consequently, social-personality psychology
theories assume a self that is autonomous, independent from
others, unique, and fundamentally separate from others,
[. . .] termed the independent self-construal.6 [. . .] Behavior,
goals, or relationships that threaten the self or do not express
the “real” self (defined as independent and separate from
other influences) are viewed as inauthentic and lacking in
power to provide persistence or happiness [. . .].” (Cross and
Gore 230)
Intriguingly, however, recent studies on the “cultural ground-
ing” of intimacy run counter to this perception and contend that
while “independent constructions of self may indeed render the
pursuit of closeness and intimacy problematic [. . .], a cultural
perspective suggests that the prominent concern with closeness
and intimacy is ultimately grounded in (rather than at odds with)
independent constructions of self”(Adams,Anderson, andAdonu
331).
However, the sturdy, centralized self of muchNorthAmerican
thinking about intimacy has been under assault for some time, if
only in the sense that its self-definition,not merely its behaviour, is
increasingly understood as relational:“In interdependence theory,
the relations between individuals are as real and meaningful as the
individuals themselves” (Rusbult, et al. 138). And, as Ickes,
Hutchison, and Mashek assert, “[t]o put it simply, true relation-
ships demand intersubjectivity” (358).However, these last authors
point out, precedents for intersubjectivity include egoistical inter-
subjectivity, in which mode an individual tends to regard the other
“as a mental representation—as a personality type, a social-cate-
gory member, or a role-occupant,”as contrasted with radical inter-
subjectivity, during which“we no longer relate merely to our image
or mental construction of each other, but instead experience each
other’s subjectivity more directly through our intersubjective
exchange” (359). Extending these ideas through the psychological
concepts of individuation and deindividuation first proposed by
P.G. Zimbardo in 1969, Ickes,Hutchison, and Mashek propose the
psychological constructs of subjective and intersubjective social
cognition:
[S]ubjective social cognition is the product of remembered,
imagined, or anticipated social interaction rather than real,
ongoing social interaction. [. . .] [I]ntersubjective social
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cognition [. . .] enables us to apprehend the other’s subjec-
tivity as it aligns with and “blends into” our own. It also
enables us to appreciate others as being capable of greater
self-determination,of being able to transcend their ascribed
identities, roles and attributes to think and act in novel and
unexpected ways. (361)
Lest the spectre of “blend[ing]” intersubjectivity should
appear overly self-threatening,however, amodel further extending
this work has been proposed that seems at once both more “rad-
ical” (relatively speaking) and more familiar in its commodified
underpinnings. The “self-expansion model” of Aron,Mashek, and
Aron (echoing corporate growth through acquisition) “postulates
that in a close relationship each person includes in the self, to some
extent, the other’s resources, perspectives, and identities” (27).
Resources here refer to
material goods, knowledge (conceptual, informational,
procedural), and social assets that can facilitate the achieve-
ment of goals [. . .] [F]rom a motivational point of view, the
main benefit of including other in the self would be the
resources aspect; the perspectives and identities aspectsmay
follow as generally unconscious side effects, a restructuring
of the cognitive system. (27-28)
This brief survey is, of course, neither exhaustive nor rigor-
ously representative. Yet what fascinates throughout this range of
current efforts to define the operations of self-hood in intimate
contexts are the increasingly acquisitional strategies proposed as
means of establishing, maintaining, protecting, and expanding
self-perceptions of autonomy. The basic principle that intimacy is,
first and foremost, about one’s self is, thus, thoroughly and consis-
tently reiterated.
ii. risking exposure
In research stemming from [social-penetration] theory,
intimacy is measured by the breadth and depth of self-
disclosure. (Piorkowski 11)
Beyond the diverse realm of methodology, however, there is
surprising consistency in the literature in terms of the basic criteria
for intimacy. As Karen J. Prager observes in The Psychology of
Intimacy, “All conceptions of intimate interactions [. . .] seem to
center on the notion that intimate behavior consists of sharing that
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which is personal”(20-21).“Self-disclosure”appears in virtually all
the descriptions of intimacy encountered in the research for this
article, and it seems difficult to underestimate its significance.
Lynn Jamieson has noted the popular preoccupation with“disclos-
ing intimacy,”which she describes as“an intimacy of the self rather
than an intimacy of the body” (1). Within multiple definitions,
self-disclosure is repeatedly presented as either the precursor or
the necessary complement to two other basic operations, detailed
below by Prager and Roberts:
[A]n intimate interaction is distinguished from other kinds
of interactions by three necessary and sufficient conditions:
self-revealing behavior, positive involvement with the other,
and shared understandings. Self-revealing behaviors are
those that reveal personal, private aspects of the self to
another, or invite another into a zone of privacy. [. . .] [A]n
involved partner devotes full attention to the encounter
[. . .]. In an intimate interaction, both partners experience a
sense of knowing or understanding some aspect of the
other’s inner experience—from private thoughts, feelings,
or beliefs, to characteristic rhythms,habits, or routines [. . .].
(45)
This triad of self-disclosure, positive response, and mutual
understanding echoes across diverse orientations on intimacy,7 in
a sense providing the grounds upon which the multiple under-
standings of personality and identity are tested and complicated.
However, Prager’s work is also particularly useful in her differenti-
ation between“intimate interactions”and“intimate relationships”:
Intimate interactions and intimate relationships [. . .] each
refer to a different and clearly distinguishable notion of
space and time. Interactions refer to dyadic behavior that
exists within a clearly designated space-and-time frame-
work. [. . .] Relationships, however, exist in a much broader,
more abstract space-and-time framework. [. . .] They
continue in the absence of any observable behavior between
partners. [. . .] [C]haracteristics of the immediate context
(time of day, nature of occasion, physical surroundings)
may strongly affect a particular interaction but have min-
imal effect on a relationship [. . .]. [O]nly a fraction of the
interactions in an intimate relationship is intimate [. . .].
[I]ntimate interactions clearly do not always occur in rela-
tionships. [. . .] [I]ntimate disclosures may occur in interac-
tions between strangers precisely “because of the unlikeli-
hood of a further relationship and the attendant opportun-
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ities for betrayal” (Wynne and Wynne 385, italics in origi-
nal). (Prager 19, italics in original)
This distinction is particularly significant in that it complicates
general perceptions of the relationship between intimacy and
passion. According to Vohs and Baumeister, “The standard view
holds that long-term romantic relationships make a transition
from passionate love to compassionate love, and the transition is
essentially a shift from passion to intimacy as the main founda-
tion” (191).However, the separation of intimate relationships from
intimate interactions enables more complex and variable under-
standings of intimacy and problematizes the traditional separa-
tion of passionate and intimate experience.
While self-disclosure is the prerequisite catalyst, it is, perhaps,
the last of the three basic criteria—mutual understanding between
the partners in an intimate interaction—that would seem themost
difficult to verify,measure, or even quantify. It is also, according to
much of the literature, the point at which the “loop” of intimacy is
most likely to fail.The odds are improved if each partner strives for
what Prager and Roberts term
[f]ull involvement of the organismic self [which]means that
the person’s moment-to-moment attention is not distracted
but is instead fully focused upon self, partner, and interac-
tion [. . .] [This] permits spontaneity and a lack of defensive-
ness at the same time that it promotes an unfiltered,accurate
understanding of the partner. (50)
Intimate attention, in a sense, generates a “space” of safety,
support, and permission to both disclose and to experiment in the
act of that disclosure, due to increased confidence that one will be
both seen and understood.
Culture
i. self-serve society…
TheVictorian era—the height of print culture—was a time
of “secrets.” […] Our own age, in contrast, is fascinated by
exposure. Indeed, the act of exposure itself now seems to
excite us more than the content of the secrets exposed.
(Meyerowitz 311, italics in original)
The socio-anthropological take on this wrestling with selfhood
and intimacy is, again, from a humanities perspective,more famil-
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iar in its modes of analysis (and, possibly, in its inconclusiveness).
Jamieson’s Intimacy: Personal Relationships in Modern Societies
(1998) provides a truncated but instructive overview of key influ-
ences on, and transition in attitude about, intimacy between the
“Pre-modern/pre-industrial”period through to the“‘Postmodern’
period” within “Euro-North American” populations.8 Within this
somewhat vague jurisdiction, her survey perceives a clear evolu-
tionary increase in individualism and an interrelated growth in the
demand for/influence of individual choice as personal expectation,
commercial strategy, social reality, biological determinant, and
ideological base (15-42). What quickly becomes apparent is that
the tendency to see North American individualism as hypotheti-
cally at odds with general conceptions of intimacy equally under-
pins much socio-anthropological discussion, as well.
Related literature from both American and European schol-
ars, including (not surprisingly) that to which Jamieson refers, is
decidedly pessimistic about ever-increasing individualism and its
impact on the possibilities of intimacy. The term “fabric” (as in
“tearing,”“shredding,” and“unraveling”) is frequently called upon.
Zygmunt Bauman’s comments are familiar in their association
between the decreasing interest in and capability of personal inter-
action and the lure of consumer distractions:
Unable to cope with the challenges and problems arising
from their mutual relations, men and women turn to
marketable goods, services and expert counsel; they need
factory[-]produced tools to imbue their bodies with socially
meaningful ‘personalities’ [. . .] or simply factory-produced
noise (literal and metaphorical) to ‘suspend’ social time and
eliminate the need to negotiate social relations. (164)
Narrowing the focus, Andrew Cherlin directly identifies the chal-
lenge of increasing individualism to traditional family structures:
Since the mid-1960s, the quest for self-fulfilment and inti-
macy has taken an even more individualistic tone; increas-
ingly what counts is one’s own emotional satisfaction,even if
it clashes with the needs of spouses and children and even if
it leads to the break-up of a marriage. (38)
Noting individualism’s self-consuming assault on both “natural”
(procreation) and “cultural” (marriage) phenomena, British
anthropologist Marilyn Strathern asserts that “the individual
vanishes not just from a surfeit of individuality. It vanishes when it
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no longer seems relevant to talk about its environment and thus
[. . .] about ‘its relationship’ to society” (150).
Ironically, formany of these analysts, amisguided and literally
“self ”-defeating desire for/pursuit of intimacy is inextricably
woven into this runaway individualism. In a consistently evolving
argument that spans three decades, Richard Sennett has explored
the consequences and implications of what he sees as the constant
erosion of the distinctions between public and private life in twen-
tieth- and twenty-first-century capitalist societies, exemplified in
an indefinite and sprawling conception of the self increasingly
drawn to self-exposure. Wary of “the project of the self,” Sennett
describes “the intimate society” that is utterly preoccupied with
personal relationships and that apparently cannot delve too deeply
into the intimate depths of the individual psyche: “social relation-
ships of all kinds are real, believable, and authentic the closer they
approach the inner psychological concerns of each person” (Fall
259). Corralled into a highly circumscribed self-absorption that is
largely disconnected from concepts of collectivity, accumulated
accomplishment, or past experience, the“ideal self”of contempor-
ary capitalism experiences intimacy as an intense, short-term
consumable.9
ii.pursuit of purity
[. . .] the reflexive project of self [. . .] (Giddens,Modernity 244)
It should be noted that the “the project of the self,” a concept thor-
oughly explored by numerous sociologists,10 is not uniformly
understood as a site of trepidation. Prominent among writers who
identify turn-of-the-millennium western individualism as poten-
tially fertile soil for both identity and intimacy is the proficient
Anthony Giddens. His thirty-some books span and intertwine his
related expertise in economics and political science,11 and in his
most immediately relevant offerings,Modernity and Self-Identity
(1991) andThe Transformation of Intimacy (1992),Giddens effect-
ively (if implicitly) marks a transition into a postmodern under-
standing of identity. In the process, he remodels the“project of the
self” as the “reflexive project of self” and, more specifically, “the
process whereby self-identity is constituted by the reflexive order-
ing of self-narratives [. . .] bymeans of which self-identity is reflex-
ively understood, both by the individual concerned and by others”
(Modernity 243-44). The resulting “trajectory of the self” repre-
sents individual continuity between the past and an anticipated
future by means of the demanding task of maintaining and
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constantly “reworking” one’s inevitably “fragile” self-narratives
“against the backdrop of shifting experiences of day-to-day life
and the fragmenting tendencies of modern institutions”
(185-186).
The myriad implications of this and related hypotheses are
rather less provocative in 2008 than when they first emerged.
While there is neither the space nor the requirement here for a
thorough survey of contemporary interpretations within the
humanities of the impact of postmodernity on subjectivity, Terry
Eagleton’s revisionist musings on The Illusions of Postmodernism
(regardless of one’s assessment of his argument) give a clear indi-
cation of the distance that was being and has been traveled.
The freedom of the classical liberal subject was always
curbed, in theory at least, by its respect for the autonomy of
others. Without such respect it would risk collapse, since
others would then not respect its autonomy either. But if
there are no autonomous others out there, then the freedom
of the subject, in fantasy at least, comes bursting through the
juridico-political frame which once contained it. This,
however, is something of a Pyrrhic victory, since there is also
no longer any unified subject in here to whom the liberty in
questionmight be attached. [. . .] All the subject would seem
to be free of is itself. (87)
In particular, Eagleton’s argument (published only four years after
The Transformation of Intimacy), in its harnessing of the dissolu-
tion of the unified self to complex and contradictory economic
forces and desires, would seem to emerge directly out of the inter-
section of psychological and sociological determinants explored
above.
Nonetheless, foremost among the possibilities engendered by
Giddens’s contributions, for the purposes of the current argument,
is his proposal of the “pure relationship.” Jamieson provides a
concise gloss of themultiple conditions Giddens traces on the road
to this concept:
globalization, disembeddedness, risk, dominance of experts
and abstract systems, reflexivity.The pace of social change is
such that traditions are more profoundly swept away than
ever before [. . .]. The revolutions in communication tech-
nology and transport penetrate every part of the globe,
promoting both the homogenization of culture and a sense
of choice, reducing cultures to alternative lifestyles disem-
bedded from their time and place. (39)12
64 • TRiC / RTaC • 29.1 (2008) • Bruce Barton • pp 51-92
While multiple commentators find in these conditions a degree of
self-absorption-via-self-exposure so all-consuming as to all but
eliminate the possibility of relational intimacy, Giddens looks to
the same and identifies the potential for unprecedented personal
discovery and creation bymeans of intense intimacy in the context
of the pure relationship.
“A pure relationship,” Giddens contends, “is one in which
external criteria have become dissolved: the relationship exists
solely for whatever rewards that relationship can deliver. In the
context of the pure relationship, trust can be mobilised only by a
process of mutual disclosure” (Modernity 6). Intimacy, then,
becomes the currency of late modernity (or, arguably, dawning
postmodernity), the site of social exchange in a culture of hyper
self-awareness,unlimited choice,unrestrainedmobility, and ongo-
ing self-authorship: “[A pure relationship] refers to a situation
where a social relation is entered into for its own sake [. . .] and
which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parities to
deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay within it”
(Transformation of Intimacy 58).
WithGiddens’s proposals, arguably, the very concept of intim-
acy undergoes a fundamental shift in themarch to the turn-of-the-
millennium. For, when interpreted through the terminology
adapted from Prager’s psychological model, Giddens’s argument
would seem to describe the transition from durable, long-term
intimate relationships to focused, intense, and self-defining inti-
mate interaction. No longer a condition or state that provides
unbroken contextualization, a constant undercurrent operative
even in the absence of detectable activity, the pure relationship
emerges, in effect, as the transient, constructed, perpetually and
consciously agreed upon site of intimate interactivity.
Communications
i.machine dreams
The ultimate lesson of virtual reality is the virtualization of
the very true reality. By the mirage of “virtual reality,” the
“true” reality itself is posited as a semblance of itself, as a
pure symbolic construct. (Žižek 22)
In the 20/20 hindsight of retrospection,Anthony Giddens’s specu-
lations can be recognized as part selective observation, part
creative analysis, and part utopian prediction. Without losing a
basic optimism in the potential for individuals and relationships to
survive and even thrive in contemporary capitalistic societies, his
subsequent works13 promise far fewer idealized visions of future
sexual equality and freedom from discrimination.14 However, the
extremity of the “pure relationship” as a practical model of intim-
acy by nomeans rules out its theoretical utility as a bridge to amore
specific orientation on the nature of intimacy in turn-of-the-
millennium culture. It is surprising to see the relatively modest
level of direct attention technology—in particular,media technol-
ogy—receives in much of the general literature considered above.
The preoccupationwith unmediated human exchange in the study
of relational psychology regularly seems to bypass the dense and
complex impact of mediated exchange on self-construction and
self-representation. While sociological and anthropological
research is far more sensitive to media presence in social dynam-
ics, the technologies of mediation are regularly analyzed as one of
myriad influences of comparable significance at work within the
larger machinations of international capitalism and globalization.
Giddens’s “pure relationship,” by contrast—so thoroughly expres-
sive of virtually unlimited individual choice and mobility and a
prioritizing of fully-engaged intimate interactions over the main-
tenance of anything less than completely, mutually satisfying inti-
mate relationships—seems prophetic of, if not predetermined by, a
conception of culture far more deeply immersed within and
defined by its machine dreams.
This relative diminishment (or under-representation) of the
impact of media technologies is all the more curious given that the
writings of theorists such asWalter Benjamin,Marshall McLuhan,
Jean Baudrillard, and PaulVirilio have become standard staples of
much undergraduate arts education, a clear indication of the
perceived centrality of media theory in the construction, analysis,
transmission,and application of both information and knowledge.
For instance, the legacy of Benjamin’s still startling “The Work of
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936) cannot be
overestimated. Its assessment of “authenticity” as both fundamen-
tal and thoroughly conventional, and its ambivalent acknowledge-
ment of the loss of the “aura” of originality, identified emerging
technology’s foundational social impact and largely established
the criteria for western media analysis to this day: “[T]he adjust-
ment of reality to the masses and the masses to reality is a process
of unlimited scope, as much for thinking as for perception”(735).
Marshall McLuhan shared Benjamin’s awareness of the inex-
tricable relationship between technological, cultural, and percep-
tual development; his reaction to this reality, however, was
distinctly less ambivalent. As has been widely discussed, many of
the ideas emerging fromMcLuhan’s early writing in the 1960s have
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become household catch-phrases—“the medium is the message”
and “global village”—with the result that they simultaneously
carry the presumed verification and authority of habit and
undergo the continuous reappropriation reserved for proverbs,
slogans, and popular jokes. McLuhan has certainly had his critics
(many of them), but he has also had, and has, an equal number of
informed appreciators who regularly note the continually resur-
gent relevance of his ideas. For instance, Paul Levinson, in his 1999
bookDigital McLuhan, is only one of many Internet theorists who
have suggested that McLuhan’s early concept of the global village
accurately, if indirectly, predicted the operation and significance of
the world wide web.15 According to Andrew Murphie and John
Potts, “For McLuhan, media are technologies that extend human
sense perceptions. In proposing the ‘medium is the message’,
McLuhan argues that the cultural significance of media lies not in
their content,but in the way they alter our perception of the world”
(13).16
Baudrillard’s contribution of the concept of “simulacra”
extends this analysis of media and perception, steering abruptly
from McLuhan’s qualified optimism into a vision of near apoca-
lyptic pessimism. According to Baudrillard, the unchecked and
exponentially proliferating imagery of late twentieth-century
media culture has effectively superseded “reality,” not merely
robbing originals of their “aura” but, in effect, supplanting the
function of originality. Media mediates other media, representa-
tions represent other representations, simulations simulate other
simulations, until all that remains is “simulacra,” without origin
and thus outside conventional structures of time and space, carry-
ing society forward into consumption at ever increasing velocities:
“It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideol-
ogy), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and
thus of saving the reality principle” (12-13).
If Paul Virilio is seen as rounding out this dizzyingly brief
dash from the mid-twentieth century to the turn-of-the-millen-
nium, it is difficult to miss the increasingly intense and darkly
prophetic nature of the perspectives considered.Virilio’s explicitly
titled 1995 essay “Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm!”
effectively captures his anxiety about the pace and pervasiveness of
technological change—which, he argues (along with Baudrillard,
McLuhan, and Benjamin), is systematically and unilaterally alter-
ing human perception of time and space.The result,he contends, is
“[a] fundamental loss of orientation [. . .].A duplication of sensible
reality, into reality and virtuality, is in the making. [. . .] A total loss
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of the bearings of the individual looms large. To exist, is to exist in
situ, here and now, hic et nunc. This is precisely what is being
threatened by cyberspace and instantaneous, globalized informa-
tion flows” (24).Virilio anticipates the surrender of localized time
systems to “global time,” which, in its instantaneity, in turn super-
sedes “real space” (25). Dislocated from phenomenological
perceptual indices, the common citizen is portrayed as being with-
out either strategy or defences in the face of both big government
and big business and their promotion of these destabilizing tech-
nological advances (26).
These are, admittedly, little more than selective snapshots of
much more complex systems of thought. However, they share a
persistent common assertion that media technology is not merely
one of the factors contributing to the pace, direction, and nature of
late twentieth-century cultural development, but the factor.
Radically altering the individual’s “interface”with reality, continu-
ally reshaping human perception, new media technologies are
inextricably interrelated with what is understood as not merely
desirable and imaginable, but as possible. It is difficult not to recog-
nize intriguing parallels between these perspectives and those
sociological interpretations of late twentieth-century cultural
development considered above. One of the first and perhaps most
practical observations is that whilemuch of both the psychological
and sociological material utilizes indistinct demographic and/or
geographic parameters, the primary commonality across virtually
all of the studies referenced is the access to and immersion in new
media technologies. Jamieson’s “Euro-North America” is, in fact,
not a geographical or ethnic designation; rather, the terms of refer-
ence of all the analyses offered demonstrate that “Euro-North
America” describes the populations of advanced, technologically
privileged societies governed via capitalistic democracy. Multiple
implications follow from this observation. Whereas sociological
commentators have identified a steadily increasing tendency
towards distraction and consumption,media theorists have identi-
fied the substitution of singular, distant originality with immedi-
ate, individual ownership.While sociologists have anticipated the
implosion of individuality, resulting in utter disconnection from
others and from the environment,media analysts have predicted a
deepening sense of individual isolation and disorientation due to
the triumph of simulacra over “reality” and the radical de- and re-
construction of conventional understandings of time and space.
And as Giddens’s concept of the“pure relationship”both tantalized
and provoked through its combination of sophistication and
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overly-selective analysis, McLuhan’s equally controversial, vision-
ary, and utopian “global village” was rejuvenated with the intro-
duction of the Internet.
Yet while it is tempting to align Giddens’s influence with
McLuhan’s, to do so would be to spend this “currency” prema-
turely. For a connecting aspect of all of the statements on media
technology influence noted above (albeit, to varying degrees) is
that they all give voice to what Thorstein Veblen, as early as the
1920s, termed“technological determinism.”As Murphie and Potts
explain,
Technological determinism tends to consider technology as
an independent factor, with its own properties, its own
course of development, and its own consequences.
Technological change is treated as autonomous: removed
from social pressures, it follows a logic or imperative of its
own. (12)
By contrast, Giddens’s refusal to surrender personal choice as a
central aspect of intimacy in the face of cultural determinism
pushes us deeper into media culture to discover evenmore fruitful
correspondence.
ii. idolizing
The spectacle is capital accumulated to the point where it
becomes image. (Debord 24)
No doubt one of themost widely read and referenced works on the
evolution of perception in twentieth-century media culture is
PhilipAuslander’s Liveness (1999).Arguing against any sustainable
ontological distinctions between theatre and recorded or trans-
mitted technologies such as television and film,Auslander instead
posits an analysis based on the concept of“cultural economy”(10):
“Initially,mediatized events weremodeled on live ones.The subse-
quent cultural dominance of mediatization has had the ironic
result that live events now frequently are modeled on the very
mediatized representations that once took the self-same live events
as their models” (10-11). Auslander asserts that contemporary
mediatized perception presumesmediation,with the result that live
events are inevitably perceived through the matrix of expectations
and conventions associated with media technology (30-31).
Auslander’s dependence on relatively large-scale live events as
his case studies—rock concerts, sports events, Broadway-style
musicals—initially seems to limit his analysis to situations of this
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scale.17 However, his model of a “cultural economy” in ongoing
negotiation and competition yields unexpected benefits. In his
discussion of the early days of television, he notes that
“[d]escriptions of drama on television from this period emphasize
that television’s immediacy and intimacy make the experience of
televised drama entirely comparable to that of drama in the
theatre”18 (17, emphasis added). Auslander then cites the work of
Steven Connor to assert that
the use of giant video screens at rock concerts provides a
means of creating in a large-scale event the effect of “intim-
acy and immediacy”associatedwith smaller live events. [. . .]
Ironically, intimacy and immediacy are precisely the quali-
ties attributed to television that enabled it to displace live
performance. In the case of such large-scale events, live
performance survives as television. (32)
Auslander’s observations on, in effect, “large-scale intimacy”
align him with contemporaneous UK mass audience research, in
particular that of Nicholas Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst. In
Audiences: A Sociological Theory of Performance and Imagination,
Abercrombie and Longhurst provide an overview of dominant
interpretations or“paradigms”of mass audience activity, including
what they designate as “Behavioural” (in which the spectator is
understood as a blank slate or empty container, passively receiving
media as both form and content) and“Incorporation/ Resistance”
(involving the polar possibilities of the “Dominant Text” and the
“Dominant Audience,” with some point on the continuum
between these opposites occurring in any given audience) (3-37).
The researchers offer a third alternative to these familiar struc-
tures, however, one that intersects with Auslander’s observations
onmediated intimacy—the“Spectacle/Performance”paradigm.
The“spectacle”aspect of the paradigmdraws heavily upon the
work of Guy Debord, whose revolutionary 1994 work The Society
of the Spectacle effectively locates Baudrillard’s preoccupation with
simulacra squarely within the system of economic imperatives:
“The whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of
production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of
spectacles.All that was once directly lived has become mere repre-
sentation” (Debord 12). “The spectacle,” Debord contends, “cor-
responds to the historical moment at which the commodity
completes its colonization of social life” (29). Abercrombie and
Longhurst draw connections between the “spectacular” nature of
contemporary culture and what they term“the aestheticization of
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everyday life,” to which they turn toMike Featherstone for criteria:
1) the loss of distinctions between “high” and “low” art forms; 2)
the ability to locate art anywhere, at any time; 3) the ability to
transform any aspect of life into art; and 4) the overwhelming
proliferation of images in day-to-day culture (Abercrombie and
Longhurst 86-87).19
The “performance” aspect of Abercrombie and Longhurst’s
third paradigm is particularly significant in seeking the intersec-
tion of mass media acculturation and issues of intimacy, however.
For, paired with spectacle—and bridged to it by means of the
aestheticization of daily life—is the concept of “narcissism.” The
authors catalogue the generally recognized psychological charac-
teristics of narcissism, but caution that “[f]or our purposes [. . .]
narcissism should be seen more as a cultural condition, diffused
widely, rather than a personality disorder”(92).What they empha-
size is “the difficulty the narcissist experiences in distinguishing
the boundaries of the self, in separating him- or herself from
others. The narcissistic self is constructed and maintained only in
the reflections received from others” (90). Intriguingly, the authors
turn to Sennett’s The Fall of Public Man for his definition in
support of their own: the self in modern society is“boundaryless,”
exhibiting “a self-absorption which prevents one from under-
standing what belongs within the domain of the self and self-grati-
fication and what belongs outside it”(Sennett, qtd. inAbercrombie
and Longhurst 91).20 Ultimately, Abercrombie and Longhurst
propose, both spectacle and narcissism
are effectively the consequences of the diffusion of perform-
ance out of its originally relatively confined settings.More of
the events of everyday life are performances for which there
is an audience [while] more people see themselves as
performers being watched by others; narcissism is the treat-
ment of the self as spectacle. (96)
Based in mass audience research paradigms and methodol-
ogies,Abercrombie and Longhurst are largely restricted to dynam-
ics of consumption—primarily visual consumption. However, I
would further contend that mediatized narcissism promotes an
understanding of the self as not only performing but as performa-
tive—as“acting” in multiple senses of the term, including the idea
of acting upon, doing work, effecting change. Ultimately, I would
propose,mediatized narcissism is not only the treatment of the self
as spectacle. It is also—and more significantly—the treatment of
spectacle as the self.
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iii. loving the machine
The Internet can become not only amedium of information
transfer and transmission, but rather it can become a trans-
ducer affecting physical action. [. . .] The cyborg system
would have a ‘Fractal Flesh’—awareness and action would
be extruded to bodies and bits of bodies in a vast network of
interactive entities, augmented by agents and avatars on the
Internet. (Stelarc 394)
It is, ultimately, when one steps past the parameters of traditional
consumer contexts—theatre, television, film—that one encoun-
ters the very quickly moving surface of contemporary media
culture. It is not a coincidence that for Baudrillard, Virilio, and
Žižek the primary site of anxiety is virtuality—or that it required
the development of the Internet forMcLuhan’s fantasies to become
the new “reality.” Indeed, even Benjamin, as John McGrath has
noted,“makes the surprising assertion that individuals have a right
to self-reproduction: ‘modern man’s legitimate claim to being
reproduced’”(166).What is this, if not the“right” to a virtual exist-
ence? In each case noted above, however (with the exception of
McLuhan), a preoccupation with information in the form of
images and visual representation tends to leave the body disori-
ented and dislocated—or, simply, leave the body behind, alto-
gether. The traditional space of the body is invariably identified as
changed by these new modes of perception. However, apart from
spectres of the end of space, its implosion or annihilation, apoca-
lyptic interpretations based on visual representation and simula-
tion are largely at a loss to suggest where the body goes, what it
does, or what it becomes.
By contrast, Petran Kockelkoren suggests that bodily disorien-
tation is a normal symptom of a continuous process of physical
adaptation to new technologies. Drawing on the writings of
Merleau-Ponty, Heideggar, and Ihde, Kockelkoren notes that the
body is not “lost” or “forgotten” in these moments; rather, the
process of adaptation is expressly sensory:“the senses are sensitive
to historical fluctuations. They are constantly in motion because
they are the points of anchorage of cultural re-education” (16). He
cites the“whole battery of train sicknesses”that were reported at the
beginning of rail travel, only to disappear from medical discourse
after a few decades: “The orientation from a moving train chal-
lenges the culturally established, previous habits of viewing. People
had to appropriate a new, technologicallymediated sensory regime.
At first they became decentred, then they learnt to recentre them-
selves through the simultaneous embodiment of the train” (17).
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Further, Kockelkoren asserts, “Such stabilization processes are not
once off, but keep on recurring as new technologies appear.”
It is fascinating, in this light, to compare two descriptions of
sensory “decentring” separated by a century of technological
change. The first was penned by the French writer Victor Hugo in
the late 1800s.The second is found inMurphie and PottsCulture&
Technology (2003) and offers an interpretation of contemporary
visual culture as it is described in Baudrillard’s Simulacra and
Simulations:
The flowers by the side of the road are no longer flowers but
flecks, or rather streaks, of red or white; there are no longer
any points, everything becomes a streak; the grainfields are
great shocks of yellow hair; fields of alfalfa, long green
tresses; the towns the steeples, and the trees perform a crazy
mingling dance on the horizon; from time to time, a
shadow, a shape, a spectre appears and disappears with
lightning speed behind the window: it’s a railway guard.
(qtd. in Kockelkoren 16-17)
This is what Baudrillard means by “the precession of simu-
lacra”: the representation of the real comes before the real,
so that it becomes the real. Simulations no longer refer to
real objects, people, facts and societies. They increasingly
refer only to each other, moving faster and faster. Think of
advertising. Think of the video clip. In this maelstrom of
simulation the real disappears. No meanings, just media-
produced simulations. No coherent society—just a whirl of
signs through a now inconsequential ground of bodies. The
Internet. (16)
The passages are strikingly similar in their desperate attempts
to articulate unchecked acceleration, in their rapid accumulation
of transitory representations, in their resort to elemental imagery
(“lightning,” “maelstrom”) to describe massive, impersonal (but
decidedly not “natural”) forces, and in their final, abrupt clinging
to a distinct formal marker of radical change (“a railway guard,”
“The Internet”)—once unknown,momentarily foreign, and from
that point on permanently enmeshed in experience.
It is easier for some than for others to remember,however, that
the drastic experience of decentring that can be brought on by
technological change is most profoundly experienced by those in
the centre at the time of its advent. For those already “off balance”
in the dominant material and ideological conditions of a given
moment in society, profound re-orientation can, in fact, be experi-
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enced as an opportunity for positive change. As Donna Haraway
has asserted, the deep destabilization that is threatened by cyborg
culture’s brazen disregard for impermeable biological, ontological,
philosophical, social, and political distinctions may be experi-
enced by some as social and personal entropy and disintegration;
for others, however, it holds the key to unprecedented empower-
ment through self-authorship.As she proposes in her surprisingly
early (1985) essay,“AManifesto for Cyborgs,”
It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation
between human and machine. [. . .] Insofar as we know
ourselves in both formal discourse (e.g., biology) and in
daily practice (e.g., the homework economy in the inte-
grated circuit), we find ourselves to be cyborgs, hybrids,
mosaics, chimeras. [. . .] There is no fundamental, ontologi-
cal separation in our formal knowledge of machine and
organism,of technical and organic. (97)
What Haraway calls for is more than the “embodiment of
technology” (17) to which Kockelkoren refers. Rather, it is, in a
sense, an ongoing, reciprocal, multi-interface intimacy with tech-
nology that Haraway describes, a “pure relationship” (i.e., interac-
tion) between the biological and the technological that is based in
unconditional self-disclosure, a complete and positive openness to
engagement, and a “continuous loop” of successful intellectual,
emotional, and physiological information exchange. The distinc-
tion proposed by Jamieson between “an intimacy of the self” and
an “intimacy of the body” is no longer tenable in this context, as
Haraway instead envisions unprecedented levels of interactivity
based on the rejection of such dualisms, categorizations, and hier-
archy, asserting instead a celebration of plurality and individuality.
Amajor consequence of this shift, according to the biotechnologist
Ollivier Dyens, is that “[w]e are not witnessing the end of great
ideological stories but their infinite proliferation, and to such a
point that formerly unwavering representations like time, space,
life, and death are also mutating andmultiplying” (35).Ultimately,
Dyens asserts, “[b]ecause of technology, the world has become a
series of exclusive and personal realms.”
iv. going with the flow
Nothing is at all reported fully [. . .]. Yet the flow of hurried
items establishes a sense of the world: of surprising and
miscellaneous events coming in, tumbling over each other
from all sides. (Williams 118-119)
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Haraway’s and Dyen’s contributions are, indeed, manifestos, and
many individuals residing in turn-of-the-millennium mediatized
cultures have neither the inclination nor the stomach to live—or
seek intimacy—at such a feverish pitch. However, this does not
alter the fact that citizens of mediatized cultures do, indeed, love
their machines—in no small part because, increasingly, their
machines love them. Unlike the “pure relationship” proposed by
Haraway or Dyens,however, it is, apparently, formost individuals a
far less clear and open relationship, characterized less by the full
involvement of the“organismic self”than bymultiple,overlapping,
intersecting, interrupting, and perpetually reconfiguring interac-
tions or, more accurately, flows of information and experience. As
noted, human perception is in a constant state of adaptation—
“decentring” and “recentring”—in its relationship to advancing
media technologies. However, as Karen Ross and Virginia
Nightingale have observed, new media increasingly “anticipates”
its interface with human perception and its need to accommodate
human bodies in its operation. Citing the work of contemporary
theorists such as Jonathan Crary, Benedict Anderson, and Richard
Butsch,21 the authors point out that“bodies are presupposed by the
media” (Ross and Nightingale 19) and that “media technologies
engage audiences because their design interfaces with, and ampli-
fies, sensory dimensions of the human body. The ‘body-sensitivi-
ty’ of media illustrates the radical reconceptualization of cultural
production, and the role of audiences in it” (34).
At this point in their argument, Ross and Nightingale
refer to the work of RaymondWilliams, the first commentator on
“flow technology”; whatWilliams observed, the authors point out,
is that “commercialization of the media and its flow technology
dramatically lessened the importance attributed to any one text,
and privileged the continuous supply of cultural material over the
quality of cultural work” (34). Beyond issues of mass information
transmission, they contend, the transition to flow technology, in its
treatment of texts as“interchangeable and interruptible,”generates
myriad points at which individuals—and individual human
bodies—interface with media systems in increasingly active and, I
would add, intimate ways. The implications, Ross and Nightingale
suggest, are both ominous and encouraging:
Today, the digitalization, computerization and mobilization
of telephony generates almost daily press speculation that
the mobile phone is fragmenting the computer—miniatur-
izing, mobilizing and fragmenting its interactive capacity
across a diverse array of new digital media that bind people
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into the consumerist capitalism of contemporary democ-
racy. [. . .] Making media more mobile, extending the range
of media we engage with in the course of doing other things,
weaves human bodies into new audience phenomena [. . .].
Connectivity and networking put a different, and more
active, spin on discussion about what audiences do, and this
in turn challenges us to reconsider both the foundational
audience activities—viewing, listening and reading—and
the ways the social and cultural meaning of these activities
has changed over the years. (39-40)
If we pair Ross and Nightingale’s flow-induced ambivalence
with the narcissism at the core of Abercrombie and Longhurst’s
“Spectacle/Performance” paradigm, it becomes apparent just how
thoroughly the concept of “audience” must be reinterpreted. The
extent of perpetual fragmentation and reintegration of media
technology that Ross and Nightingale reference, above, goes well
beyond issues of audience choices and activities in terms of infor-
mation and entertainment; it does not merely generate “unprece-
dented opportunities for engaging more actively.” In a cultural
context where individuals understand “the self as spectacle,” the
concept of “engaging” is superseded by that of “self-perform-
ance”—or, perhaps more accurately, merely “performance,” in
which individuals understand the act of engagement, the process
of performance—the spectacle—as self. In the process, this “spec-
tacle-self” effectively surrenders the ability—perhaps even the
desire—to be defined,maintained,and protected as“autonomous”
with any sort of continuity or stability in the interchanges and
interruptions of mediatized culture. Indeed, as John McGrath
contends, even self-ownership is a constant issue of ambiguity,
anxiety, and ongoing negotiation:
In contemporary society our ‘legitimate claim to being
reproduced’ is no longer sternly denied by an industrial
capital insisting upon our passive consumption of mass
images. Instead, an unreliable, although exploitative, image
machine multiplies our bodies in digital data streams—
across the border from our consciousness or even our
knowledge, but reappearing shockingly, reassuringly,
suggestively,disruptively in our lives. [. . .]And as we learn to
move within and also love this surveillance space, our
responses to its problems, its challenges, are no longer
yes/no, good/bad, crime prevention/Big Brother, but a
subtle and unending array of detours, disruptions, exagger-
ations and alliances: counter-surveillances. (McGrath 195)
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Surveillance and counter-surveillance, interruption and
disruption, ambiguity and ambivalence, empowerment and
exploitation—what is the nature of this “new kind of space” to
which McGrath refers? How do its qualities and characteristics
reshape and reconfigure the psychological and sociological
conceptions of the self—the fully postmodern (or post-postmod-
ern) “spectacle-self”—and what, ultimately, are its consequences
for the nature or possibility of intimacy should that interaction
(commonly, if not inevitably) fall short of the“pure relationship”of
fully“organismic”cyborg love?
Intermedia
i. playing with our selves
Intermedia is [. . .] a formal category of exchange.
(Spielmann 133)
[I]ntermedia is not performance, but performative
action. (Busse 264)
Intermedia has reached its sell-by date as soon as it has
developed a normative structure of its own. (Bertram
271)
“The problem of self,” Philip Auslander contends in “Just Be
Yourself: Logocentrism and Différance in Performance Theory,”
“is, of course, central to performance theory” (29-30). Indeed,
Derrida’s deconstruction of unified subjectivity in Writing and
Difference—written in 1967 and translated into English in 1978—
utilized, in part, theatrical contextualization to argue the
constructedness of subjectivity via its dependence on language.22
As Auslander notes, “Theorists as diverse as Stanislavsky, Brecht
andGrotowski all implicitly designate the actor’s self as the logos of
performance; all assume that the actor’s self precedes and grounds
her performance and that it is the presence of this self in perform-
ance that provides the audience with access to human truths.”
However, he continues,“An examination of acting theory through
the lens of deconstruction reveals that the self is not an
autonomous foundation for acting, but is produced by the
performance it supposedly grounds” (30). Derrida’s contribution,
Elinor Fuchs observed in 1985, related to his proposal that
there is no primordial or self-same present that is not already
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infiltrated by the trace—an opening of the “inside” of the
moment to the “outside” of the interval. ‘That the present in
general is not primal,but rather, reconstituted, that it is not the
absolute,wholly living formwhich constitutes experience, that
there is no purity of the living present’ is the theme running
through every textual exegesis Derrida hasmade. (165)
Influenced, in part, by this assertion, is what Fuchs describes as a
“theatre of Absence” that utilizes a “new textuality [that] disperses
the center, displaces the Subject, destabilizes meaning” (165). The
resulting performances are “neither a reenactment of the logocen-
tric dilemma, as in traditional theatre, nor a rebellion against it
(which ends up recapitulating it anyway), but[,] one might say, an
effort at strategic containment” (171).
Clearly, these issues of subjectivity’s encounter with the spatial
and temporal complexities of representation, so pervasive in post-
modern modes of performance, have never demonstrated such
intense manifestation as in current intermedial practice. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, that Auslander ends his discussion of
the “problem of self” in the above-cited essay by casting his atten-
tion on theWooster Group—which, he proposes, holds the key to
undoing the logocentric foundation of acting. In effect, as the
Wooster Group has virtually become synonymous with inter-
media performance,Auslander suggests that turning to intermedi-
ality offers a (perhaps the) next step in the discussion of perform-
ance’s other “selves.” However, in a defining transition, “contain-
ment,” strategic or otherwise, is likely not to be found among such
performances’motivations or intentions.
As suggested at the beginning of this article, intermedia is the
logical site of artistic practice to bring our questions about
performance and intimacy inmediatized culture, as it is thematrix
in which all these concerns are directly andmost thoroughly inter-
connected. Intermedia is, as we are (“we” as citizens in western,
technologically-immersed societies governed via capitalistic
democracy), a child of mediatized culture. Like us, it is attempting
to come to terms with contemporary conceptions of “self-hood,”
and, like us, it is contemplating the nature and possibility of intim-
acy in present-day realities with a precisely similar combination of
knowledge/ignorance/experience of history. And, perhaps most
significantly, like us, intermedia is many different things.
Simultaneously.
In translating Christopher Balme’s German writing on inter-
mediality, Peter Boenisch reports (at least) “three quite different
understandings of that term”:
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• the transposition of a subjectmatter or the segment of a text
from onemedium into another, or
• a specific form of intertextuality, or
• the re-creation of aesthetic conventions of one particular
mediumwithin a different medium. (35)
However, as the brief quotations at the head of this section
suggest, formany intermedia artists the impetus behind their prac-
tice is less theoretical than personal and ideological, and the resort
to intermedia is more closely related to the meanings that the term
attempts to elude than those it attempts to capture. Intermedia,
wrote Hannah Higgins, effectively coining the term for current
usage, is an“unstable descriptive term [. . .] a function, allowing for
almost limitless artistic formations and experiences”(qtd. in Busse
265).23 According to Peter Frank,
[Intermedia] comes in the form of conceptual art, perform-
ance art, video art, new dance, graphically-notated music
and music involving theatrical activity, a new theater based
on extra-theatrical sources, visual poetry, phonetic poetry,
poetry that maintains words but ignores syntax, and all the
areas of adventure and experiment lying in, among, and
between these.These forms, for their part, lie between paint-
ing, sculpture, graphic art, traditional sonic music, typical
verse, ordinary dance, normal theater, and whatever else we
are used to. [. . .] [W]e need not get un-used to the old segre-
gated forms to come to the new; the fusing of the arts into
intermedia only augments our old ways of experiencing
phenomena, it does not supersede them. (31, italics in origi-
nal)
There is much here to work with, but of primary interest for
my purpose is Frank’s rear-guard but determined defence of more
traditional artistic categorizations. Similarly, across diverse under-
standings of intermedia one finds a relatively common relation-
ship to history that is now familiarly associated with theories of
postmodernism. Intermedial work is not ignorant of the past—
indeed, many performances conspicuously and copiously refer-
ence historical events, figures, art forms, and ideas—but its rela-
tionship is multiple, selective, and interpretive, often combining
satire with reverence and historical “accuracy” with unbridled
creation. Unlike the modern avant-garde movement, intermedia
seldom pins itself beneath strident or consistent relationships with
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tradition (even relationships of arbitrary deconstruction); its
stance is seldom “critical” in the conventional understanding of
this term,which implies a stability of critical position and perspec-
tive. Rather, to use a term from Frank’s comments, and which
appears regularly in the literature, intermedia tends to operate
between traditional categories, positions, and practices (thus the
investment in the retention of existing art forms).
In similar fashion, Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt define
intermediality as “a powerful and potentially radical force, which
operates in-between performer and audience; in-between theatre,
performance and other media; and in-between realities [. . .] In
addition, intermediality is positioned in-between several concep-
tual frameworks and artistic/philosophical movements” (12). The
effects of intermediality, they contend, include “new modes of
representation; new dramaturgical strategies; new ways of struc-
turing and staging words, images and sounds; new ways of posi-
tioning bodies in time and space; new ways of creating temporal
and spatial interrelations” (11). Yet, according to Frank and other
practitioners, it would seem that this“new[ness],”as the product of
a clear-eyed evasiveness and agility in reference to existing cate-
gories and practices, is less linear or determinedly progressive in
nature than reflexive, gregarious, manipulative, exploratory, and
adaptive. Specifically, this “space of the in-between” (Chapple and
Kattenbelt 12) can situate history and memory on even terms and
in constant exchange. Writing of theorist/practitioner Gregory
Ulmer,Murphie and Potts report that
Ulmer invents a new genre that he calls ‘mystory’, which
‘takes into account the new discursive and conceptual ecol-
ogy interrelating orality, literacy, and videocy’. [. . .] Gone
are prescriptive formulas that any member of a culture is
supposed to follow [. . .]. Instead we have ‘chorography’—a
transitory method that always seeks the ‘impossible possi-
bility’ [. . .] that lies between genres, between conflicting
notions of nation and self, between imagination and given
knowledge, between choreography and geography [. . .]. He
treats memory as a reservoir for creative invention [. . .].As
he puts it, “‘teletheory’ allows us to want to ‘learn how to
remember’ [. . .] in a different way.” (93-94)
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Fittingly, then, while intermedia is regularly called a “space,”
the qualities of that space are directly described in terms of
constant movement, exchange—flow—rather than volume or
density:
‘Intermedia’ thus presents itself in multiple ways, as [. . .] a
medial space for trans-disciplinary work with potentially all
media. [. . .] Very generally defined, intermedia can be
conceived of as product of exchange or production of the
exchange between different,meaning-generating systems in
time and space. [. . .] To put it bluntly: intermedia is not
performance, but performative action.” (Busse 264)
At the same time, however, Busse contends, “Intermedia means
media criticism” (265), and Yvonne Spielman asserts that the
primary mode of intermedia performance is self-reflection (130).
But the critical stance of much intermedia performance is actually
less “stance” than “dance,” in which the stated goal is that media
become engaged, lived, embodied, and naturalized. Rather than
Brechtian alienation, intermedia often attempts to enact the
symbiosis of body and machine, locating each within the lived
context of contemporary experience.As Hanno Hardt suggests,
Intermedia as a creative environment [. . .] promotes the
accessibility of ideas by making use of a banal familiarity
with technologies of communication. The latter remain
identifiable structures of a modern existence to ease partici-
pation in the social and political discourse with their
constant presence in the life of a contemporary society.
(236)
The space of intermedia, then, is thoroughly performative,
established through a physical force of intention enacted as a claim
“in-between” established, conventional uses and understandings
of space, time, and attention. It is a multiple, fragmentary, simul-
taneous space of interruption, dislocation, ambiguity; yet, for citi-
zens of mediatized culture it is likely not a space of disorientation
or ambivalence. Rather, perhaps, it is a space of “mystory.” It is,
perhaps, a space of intimacy.
ii. intimedia
Whenever possible, we attempt to create intimacy with the
audience by sharing the performance space with them.
(Bluemouth 17)
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What, then, can this mean?What can it mean to suggest that inter-
media is, perhaps, a space of intimacy—is, perhaps, the space of
intimacy in a wired world?
Intimacy as a relationship is apparently a time machine, heav-
ily loaded with the frustrations of the past and expectations for the
future. It is a primary process of self-definition andmaintenance, a
pull and push, attraction and withdrawal. It is an engagement with
an other in which the components and boundaries of subjectivity
are configured and demarcated via regular and regulated intersub-
jective negotiation. Performance that seeks an intimate relation-
ship with its audience thus must confront its spectators’ individual
and composite histories of experience with performance.Will this
performance—this new site of utter potential—make up for, or
merely add to, past disappointments? Will it prove too vital, too
present, too intrusive, and drive the spectators into withdrawal,
distraction, distance? Or will it further enrich and expand the
spectators’ relationship to the presenting organization, allowing
that relationship to mature (even “mellow”) to increased levels of
familiarity, comfort, and“compassion”(Vohs and Baumeister)?
Certainly, such a relationship, so thoroughly dependent on its
position in a continuity—a tradition—of such relationships, on
the reassurance of stable frames of convention andmutually nego-
tiated, fixed contracts of engagement, resembles much theatrical
practice in contemporary western contexts. It is primarily a
conceptual and extended relationship, providing a self-under-
standing of enduring cultural positioning (as a “theatre-goer”). It
is one which structures its points of engagement with explicit
respect and accommodation for carefully managed “social-pene-
tration” (Piorkowski); the “zone of privacy” (Prager and Roberts)
that the spectator is invited into is determinedly public, a commu-
nally accepted and relied-upon conceit. “Self-disclosure” is mini-
mized within socially acceptable parameters designed for opti-
mum maintenance of a “real” or “true” self (Collins and Feeney),
strategically tested, validated, and tempered through vicarious
identification with adversity. It is “an intimacy of the self, rather
than an intimacy of the body” (Jamieson), of distanced albeit
potentially empathetic contemplation predicated on the assurance
that “only a fraction of the interactions in an intimate relationship
is intimate” (Prager). It is an intimacy in which the options of
“egoistical” projection (Icke, Hutchison, and Mashek) and
distracted withdrawal are, in fact, structurally anticipated and
installed within itsmost common thematics and proxemics. It is an
intimacy where economic streaming and thematic internal selec-
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tion (a version of cultural Darwinism) ensure that “the other’s
inner experience—from private thoughts, feelings, or beliefs, to
characteristic rhythms, habits, and routines” (Prager and
Roberts)—will hold minimal potential for surprise or disruption.
This is not to suggest that there are notmany challenging theatrical
companies, nor that even the most traditional of organizations do
not at times mount transgressive work.Rather,my point is that the
basic underpinnings of an intimate relationship with a regular
audience that is confident about what it is purchasing in terms of
content, form, spectator engagement, and production values—
confident, in a sense, about what is and will be understood—
comprise, collectively, a theatrical construct (in the theoretical
sense of “theatrical”24). It is an intimacy informed by investments
in lucidity, consistency, and comprehension. And in this, it is
clearly not the intimacy of intermedia.
Conversely, a performative intimacy must perhaps need be an
interaction, with a “different and clearly distinguishable notion of
space and time” (Prager), as compared to intimate relationships.A
theoretically performative intimacy is one in which the basic crit-
eria identified across multiple definitions of intimacy—a willing-
ness to self-disclose; full, positive, and mutual attention; openness
to physical contact and connection; shared understanding—is
valued and pursued outside the context of extended aesthetic,
corporate, or emotional contracts. It is an intimacy predicated on
the devaluation—even rejection—of fictional, thematic, and orga-
nizational predictability and familiarity. It is an intimacy not of
mutual familiarity, but rather one in which “intimate disclosures
may occur in interactions between strangers precisely ‘because of
the unlikelihood of a further relationship and the attendant oppor-
tunities for betrayal’” (since the concept of “betrayal” implies fixed
terms and agreements). It is an intimacy where the paradoxical
tension between the desire for connection and the anxiety that
attends the construct of an “autonomous self ” (Collins and
Feeney) is addressed less through strategies of withdrawal or“self-
expansion” (Aron,Mashek, and Aron) than through a prioritizing
of individual mobility and an emphasis on adaptation—decen-
tring and recentring (Kockelkoren)—in perpetual experiential
motion.Within such amoving field or network of intimate interac-
tion,“egoistical”and acquisitional orientations to constantly trans-
forming performers (and spectators) are far more difficult to
sustain, while disengagement is often structurally impeded and
resisted. Given that performative information is often discontinu-
ous, fragmentary, and simultaneous in nature, the potential for
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understanding lies less in a common comprehension of a specific
site of destabilization than in the recognition of destabilization,
itself,as a site of commonality.What is shared, then, is a state rather
than a location, a mode of inquiry rather than a set of “beliefs”—a
space rather than a place. It is, thus, an intimacy of “exchange,” an
intersection of “performative action” (Busse), the intense conver-
gence of flows (Williams).
It is not necessary to restrict all “performative action” to an
expression of mediatized culture to recognize the overlap of
concepts and terminology. Undeniably, however, intermedia
performance is the most explicit instance of this overlap, the site at
which the depth and extent to which mediatization and performa-
tivity collide and converge, reconfigure and define one another is
both most clear and most complex. For the intermedia artist and
the intermedia spectator, alike, embody and enact this intersection
of mediatization and performativity, radically altering the concept
of intimacy in the process.
The much-lamented progression to increasingly distracted
and supplemented individualism that I have traced through the
sociological literature identifies traditional understandings of in-
timacy as a primary casualty of twentieth-century/turn-of-the-
millennium cultural evolution. When contextualized within the
parallel observations of technological determinism, this individu-
alism is superimposed with a fundamental “loss of orientation”
(Virilio) caused by the transformation of space and time that
accompanies the transition to virtuality. Thus, the sociological
perception of voluntary individual efforts “to ‘suspend’ social time
and eliminate the need to negotiate social relations” (Bauman) is
reinterpreted as the inevitable and unavoidable outcome of the
triumph of the new “reality” of simulacra (Baudrillard). Similarly,
the escapism of “factory[-]produced tools”and“factory-produced
noise” is understood as an all-consuming transformation of indi-
viduality by means of the “embodiment of technology”
(Kockelkoren) that alters “our perception of the world”
(McLuhan). Countering these correspondingly pessimistic assess-
ments, the utopian prospect of a “pure relationship” (Giddens),
liberated through late modern mobility and unlimited choice,
finds its counterpart in the electronic “global village,” a model of
instant, international intimacy unbridled by physicality and tran-
scendent of cultural, social, and ideological distinctions.
Within the“privileged”contexts (a tricky, ironic descriptor, to
be sure) of “Euro-NorthAmerica,” the pervasiveness of mediatiza-
tion thus becomes both the fore and the ground of contemporary
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experience, and all forms of performance, in effect, participate in
its operations.Within a culture of simulacra, in which “the act of
exposure itself now seems to excite usmore than the content of the
secrets exposed” (Meyerowitz), intimacy becomes first imbricated
with, and then inextricable from, spectacle. Emerging from the
distributed “broadband” intimacy of early television and evolving
into the “large-scale” intimacy (Auslander) of mediated stadium
events, the hunger for simulated immediacy drives an accelerating
conflation of performance and spectator, a powerful identification
of self-as-spectacle (Abercrombie and Longhurst) and spectacle-
as-self. The sociological “boundaryless” self (Sennett) is thus seen
as the product of technologies that inspire, facilitate, encourage,
and reward its powerful narcissism. In the process, traditional
understandings of “performance” seem to follow the same trajec-
tory and suffer the same fate as “individualism” (Strathern), as
both concepts become ubiquitous to the point of disappearance.
Further complicating this scenario, however, is the deeper
understanding and experience of mediatization that is interactiv-
ity. Pushed to its extreme expressions in the physiological fluidity
of cyborg culture and biotechnological visions of seamless inte-
gration, intimacy becomes an experience of machine love, an indi-
vidual interaction with technology in which autonomy is happily
surrendered and reinstituted through a transcendence of tradition
and its investments in universality, dualities, and categorization
(Haraway). In the process,“the world [becomes] a series of exclu-
sive and personal realms”(Dyens),networked rather than“bound-
aryless,” simultaneous and interactive, rather than common or
communal.A short step back from this extreme, however, interac-
tivity is experienced as a site of constant, unpredictable, addictive,
and insatiable change. Characterized by incessant flow (as
opposed to travel, which implies a destination), interactivity is a
zone of interruption, transition, ambiguity, and transformation.
Within this form of interactivity, intimacy—shy of the “pure rela-
tionship” of cyborg culture—is fragmented yet intense, momen-
tary yet vivid, volatile yet visceral.A confusion (in part intentional,
in part inescapable, wholly enthusiastic) between interpersonal
and inter-technological sensuality, “media technologies engage
audiences because their design interfaces with, and amplifies,
sensory dimensions of the human body” (Ross and Nightingale),
simultaneously intoxicating (numbing) and exhilarating (sensitiz-
ing) their subject/objects.
This, predominantly, inevitably, is the site and “self” of inter-
media. The “space” into which an intermedia performance invites
TRiC / RTaC • 29.1 (2008) • Bruce Barton • pp 51-92 • 85
its audience, then, is a complex, multifarious, contradictory, and
ambiguous one.Yet, as noted, intermedia is also a space of action,
of motion—of response. The space of intermedia is an “in-
between”space (Chapple andKattenbelt)—a space of interruption
and disruption rather than continuity and validation, of historical
curiosity rather than historical accuracy or critique. Guided (but
not defined) by the capabilities (and limitations) of its explicit and
conspicuous technologies, which are both foregrounded and
rendered familiar in the same gesture, intermedia enacts, mimics,
scrutinizes, and celebrates mediatization. In the process, it
emulates, speculates upon, and attempts to transform the
processes of perception, memory, communication, and experi-
ence. It promotes self-authorship at the same time that it exhibits
the contemporary forces (primarily technological) that establish
and enforce the parameters of what can be said and done.
Intermedia is an affront, a carnival, and an evasive action—all
positionings defined by agility of response rather than predeter-
mined routes, by movement rather than location.
In this sense, intermedia is a space where intimate relation-
ships, which rely on continuity, consistency, duration, and com-
municative clarity and confidence, are virtually impossible (pun
intended). Conversely, however, intermedia is a space where in-
timate interaction, with its insistence on momentary intensity and
“organismic” attention, is virtually unavoidable. The intermedia
spectator (or, at least, all but the most naïve intermedia spectator)
anticipates the heightened self-disclosure of increased visibility,
perhaps even interactivity, and attends precisely because this posi-
tive openness to interaction is a shared expectation.Mutual under-
standing is not generated through the portrayal of shared cultural
attitudes and beliefs (which reinforce “timeless” and “universal”
values), but rather through the performance of shared perceptual
frames and dynamics (which posit ambiguity and de-/reorienta-
tion as the “constants” of contemporary existence). Intermedia
intimacy is also a time machine—but memory, rather than a
burden, hurdle, or source of habitual defences, is offered as “data,”
the irreducible amalgam of “reality” and simulacra, raw material
for reimagining “mystory” (Murphie and Potts). Both “broad-
band” and “large-scale” intimacy are exposed as carefully
constructed assurances of the unity and centrality of the spec-
tacle/self. In the process, both the spectacle and the self are demys-
tified; their power is not discounted, but rather rendered “techni-
cal,” an operation of culture and, thereby, of mediatization.
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post-amble
In the 2003 Bluemouth production Death By Water (the second
part of Something About a River), I was ushered, along with the
other members of the audience on the evening that I attended,
through the falling snow in Toronto’s Trinity Bellwoods Park to a
small,makeshift shelter.One side of the structure was transparent;
the other three were covered by white projection surfaces.
Instructed to put on a set of headphones, I experienced, with
alarming intimacy, the expressions and exertions of two miked
performers (O’Connell and Simic) who performed a vigorous
outdoor dance/struggle, at times right outside the shelter,but often
at considerable distance. The performers, at multiple removes
from the audience, invaded my personal space through the im-
mediate and inescapable—because mediated—sound of their
voices, their breathing, and the force of their powerfully connect-
ing bodies.As visual images of expansive landscapes played on the
projection screens, this visceral human expression, intertwined
with Richard Windeyer’s subtle, evocative soundscape,
constructed multiple interrelated yet incongruent perceptual
registers, each somehow both completed and irresolvably compli-
cated by the others.25 The intimate performance space that I
shared with Bluemouth that night was thus“site-specific” in multi-
ple mediated ways, as the common physical location of the park
grounds was interrupted, fragmented, folded, and multiplied
within the intensely personal site of my decentring.
The intimacy of intermedia, ultimately, is neither the “true”
relationship of the traditional theatrical contract nor the “pure”
relationship of McLuhan’s global village or Haraway’s cyborg
culture. Rather, in its decidedly impure interactions, the intimacy
of intermedia offers something“in-between,”something altogether
“other”—and in the process performs an utterly contemporary
conception of “self.” 
Notes
1 The trajectory of those articles is identified at the beginning of the
third in the series:
In CTR 126, I began a series of three linked articles that
consider aspects of the relationship between theatricality and
performativity in the work of the Toronto/New York inter-
media performance ensemble,Bluemouth Inc.The first article
explored the impact of the unanticipated relocation of the
company’s 2005 recreation of American Standard from Pat’s
Barber Shop on Toronto’s D’Arcy Street to the cavernous
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rehearsal space of Zero Gravity Circus in the same city’s
industrial East End. The second article (in CTR 127) profiled
Bluemouth Inc.’s 2005 reimaging of the performance Lenz in
the evocative (indeed, provocative) Ye Olde Carleton Arms
Hotel in New York City and, in particular, that production’s
complex negotiation between mediation and madness. The
third essay focuses specifically on Bluemouth Inc.’s sound-
scape artist, Richard Windeyer, and queries the relationship
between his sound installation work and his contributions to
the company’s collective, site-specific productions.
2 My activities with Bluemouth range from co-editing two of their
published performance texts (Lenz,with the company andCatherine
Graham, for CTR 127; andWhat the Thunder Said,with the company
and Karen Zaointz, for Reluctant Texts from Exuberant Performance
[see Barton, Corbett, Schreyer and Zaiontz]), through lengthy
conversations and emails on creative process. I am currently (2008)
in development/rehearsal as dramaturge to the company on a new
interactive performance piece based on dance marathons.
3 Bert O. States is one of the most significant proponents of a phenom-
enological analysis of theatre. SeeGreat Reckonings in Little Rooms.
4 Bluemouth Inc. Presents is Simic, O’Connell, Sabrina Reeves, and
RichardWindeyer.
5 My entry in CTR 126 focused on Bluemouth, Inc.’s 2005 remount of
American Standard, a performance piece originally conceived to be
staged in a small barbershop in Toronto. When the adjoining resi-
dents in the building discovered the company’s plans, the alerted
landlord refused permission to use the space, resulting in a scramble
to identify an alternative location. Ultimately staged in a local circus
troupe’s rehearsal space in the city’s East End industrial district, the
show utilized a minimal, “Dogville” style description of the barber-
shop layout, recreated symbolically in the open warehouse.The tran-
sition was unpredictably radical and fascinating across a span of
perceptual registers.For this spectator, the production brought to the
foreground an operative tension that I have experienced to varying
degrees in all the Bluemouth, Inc. events I have attended—between,
on the one hand, a relatively accessible, sustained, and phenomeno-
logical theatricality and, on the other, a far more volatile, interactive,
and intermedial performativity. See Barton,“The Razor’s Edge.” See
also Barton, “Through a Lenz Darkly” for an continuation of this
argument.
6 SeeMarkus and Kitayama for original use of this concept.
7 See, for instance, Collins and Feeney 163; and Vohs and Baumeister
190.
8 The geographic and/or cultural reach of Jamieson's study is indis-
tinct; as noted, there are repeated references to “Euro-North
American”populations (and given the nature of the available social-
psychological research, this is an imprecision that I have adopted
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temporarily from her study). Clearly, however, references such as “in
the 1950s” in Jamieson’s study imply American, or at least North
American, conditions. Including references to and occasional
perspectives from Australia, New Zealand, and England, the Euro-
NorthAmerica in question would seem both more and less inclusive
than initially anticipated; certainly it is predominantly, if not exclu-
sively, English-language speaking.
9 Sennett’s contribution is extensive and significant. See Sennett, The
Fall of Public Man, Corrosion of Character, Respect in a World of
Inequality, and The Culture of the New Capitalism.
10 See, for instance, Beck; and Lash and Urry.
11 Giddens is the former director of the London School of Economics
and Political Science, the author ofWhere Now for New Labour?, and
a highly relied upon advisor to Tony Blair.
12 See also Giddens,The Consequences of Modernity andModernity and
Self-Identity.
13 See, for instance,The ThirdWay and RunawayWorld.
14 Giddens originally suggested that, ultimately disentangled from the
practicalities and conventions of procreation, sexuality would
become“plastic”and open to individualistic reinvention.This in turn
would produce “a revolution of female autonomy,” resulting in
greater equality betweenmen andwomen,and foster“the flourishing
of homosexuality” (qtd. in Jamieson 38).
15 For an excellent collection of essays reconsidering McLuhan’s ideas
and impact, see Strate andWachtel.
16 SeeMcLuhan,UnderstandingMedia 16.
17 “More intimate live performancesmay not bemediatized in the same
way or to the same effect. Inasmuch as mediatization is the cultural
context in which live performances are now inevitably situated,
however, its influence nevertheless pervades even these smaller-
scaled events” (Auslander 32).
18 Auslander notes that in a 1949 article in Theatre Arts, Mary Hunter
[. . .] observes that “the audience experience in relation to the
performer is similar in television to the performer-audience relation-
ship in the theatre: the audience is in direct contact with the
performer at the moment of his ‘performance.’You see him when he
does it” (46).
19 See also Featherstone 66-67.
20 See also Sennett,Fall 8.
21 Crary investigates the evolution of visual culture; Anderson
addresses print culture; Butsch explores the changing activities of
audiences at popular entertainments in the US over the past century.
See Crary;Anderson; and Butsch.
22 SeeDerrida’s now legendary interpretation ofArtaud’s aesthetics and
dramaturgy, “The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of
Representation.”
23 See also Higgins.
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24 See, for instance,Davis; Féral; andWeber.
25 See Barton, “Still Ringing” for a more detailed analysis of this
performance and, in particular, the contribution of sound artist
RichardWindeyer.
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